Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04292 01 OF 03 312246Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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TO RUEHCSECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7818
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 4292

EXDIS/SALT

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENTS OF MAY 31, 1977
(SALT TWO - 1201)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MAY 31, 1977.

SEMENOV'S FIRST STATEMENT, MAY 31, 1977

FIRST OF ALL, ON BEHALF OF THE USSR DELEGATION AND ITS STAFF, I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME SENATOR CLAIRBORNE PELL, WHO IS WELL KNOWN FOR HIS ACTIVE WORK IN THE U.S. SENATE AND WHO IS PRESENT IN THIS ROOM TODAY AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE USSR AND U.S. DELEGATIONS TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

SEMENOV'S SECOND STATEMENT, MAY 31, 1977

AT THE MAY 13, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION SET
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04292 01 OF 03 312246Z

FORTH THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING INCLUSION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OF A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT EACH SIDE UNDERTAKES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

TODAY I WOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO DRAW THE U.S. DELEGATION'S ATTENTION TO THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR WORK.

THE POSITION OF THE USSR IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND DOES NOT CONCEIVE OF THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

REACHING AGREEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY, ON THE NON-TRANSFER PROVISION IS STRONGLY DICTATED BOTH BY THE SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND THE NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED. ENSUING FROM THE MUTUALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, INCLUSION OF APPROPRIATE WORDING IN THE DRAFT TEXT WOULD PROMOTE CONFIDENCE OF THE SIDES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT IS BEING STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH, WOULD ENHANCE TRUST BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND WOULD THEREBY FACILITATE THE WORKING OUT OF FURTHER, EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AND, CONVERSELY, WITHOUT A PRECISELY WORDED ARTICLE ON NON-TRANSFER THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE SINCE IT WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF ONE OF THE RELIABLE GUARANTEES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF ITS PROVISIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF STRICT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON NON-TRANSFER THERE WOULD REMAIN A BASIS FOR ACTIONS WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY LEAD TO SERIOUS CHANGES IN THE STRAGEGIC POTENTIAL AND UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE BY THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

ARMS. IF SUCH ACTIONS BECAME REALITY, THIS WOULD IN ESSENCE MEAN ERODING THE VERY BASIS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND IN EFFECT UNDERMINING IT.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY OF STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN A SERIED OF INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL SOVIET-U.S. DOCUMENTS OF RECENT YEARS.

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7819
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 4292

EXDIS

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PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THROUGHOUT OUR PLANET HOLDS A CENTRAL PLACE IN TERMS OF
FURTHER REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR AND STRENGTHENING
WORLD PEACE. AS L. I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, INDICATED IN HIS SPEECH ON
MAY 29, 1977, THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS "FROM
COUNTRY TO COUNTRY WILL NOT STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF ANY
ONE OF THEM AND CAN IN NO WAY HELP TO MAINTAIN THE RELATIVE
BALANCE WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THIS TIME. BUT IT WILL
INCREASE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF A NUCLEAR CONFLICT, BE IT
EVEN ACCIDENTAL. AND THEN NO 'NUCLEAR UMBRELLAS' WILL SHIELD
US FROM THE LETHAL TEMPEST. THIS IS WHY FURTHER EFFORTS ARE
NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE, WORLDWIDE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM."
THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE INCLUSION OF A NON-TRANSFER
PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE
CONTRIBUTION TO THIS VITALLY IMPORTANT CAUSE.

MR. AMBASSADOR,
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IT FOLLOWS FROM THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD THAT THE
SIDES HAVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE EFFECT THAT A NON-
TRANSFER OBLIGATION WILL BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.
THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THE CONCRETE AND BUSINESSLIKE
DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION TO BE IMPERATIVELY NECESSARY
AND URGENT IN ORDER TO WORK OUT APPROPRIATE FORMULATIONS
ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

SEMENOV'S THIRD STATEMENT, MAY 31, 1977

I

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS IN MAY 1977 THE SIDES HAVE ALREADY TOUCHED UPON THE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT AGREED PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES.

AS A RESULT OF THE PREVIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE TEXT OF AN AGREED STATEMENT CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES. THERE ARE ALSO COINCIDING ELEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE DRAFT.

THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1976. AT THE SAME TIME, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES REMAIN IN THE CURRENT PROPOSALS, REQUIRING CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION.

AT THE MEETINGS OF MAY 17 AND 24, 1977 THE USSR DELEGATIONS AND THE U.S. DELEGATION SPOKE IN FAVOR OF PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. THUS, THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US ON THE NEED TO INTENSIFY WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY, ON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5 FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED.

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THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL THE INHERENT LOGIC OF THS VOIET PROPOSAL FOR PARAGRAPH 5 OF THIS ARTICLE. THIS PROPOSAL OF OURS IS AIMED AT ENSURING STRICT COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH THE 1,320 AGGREGATE LIMIT ESTABLISHED AND, AT THE SAME TIME, AT PREVENTIN A SITUATION WHERE MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD TURN OUT TO HAVE BEEN COUNTED WITHIN THIS LEVEL.

WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SOVIET WORDING MOST FULLY MEETS THESE OBJECTIVES, AS WELL AS THE REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFIABILITY OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

AT THE SAME TIME, DURING THE RECESS IN THE WORK OF THE DELEGATION, THE SOVIET SIDE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 5.

FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS MOST UNEQUIVOCALLY

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

THAT AN APPROACH BASED ON EXAMPLES AND THE USE IN THE DOCU-
MENT BEING WORKED OUT OF SUCH CONCEPTS AS "FACTS" AND SUCH
WORD COMBINATIONS AS "HAS CONTAINED AN ICBM OR SLBM" AND

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04292 03 OF 03 010333Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7827
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USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 4292

EXDIS/SALT

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"HAS LAUNCHED AN ICBM OR SLBM" INJECT AN ELEMENT OF
ARBITRARINESS INTO THE QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION, WHICH,
BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE-SIDED INTERPRETATION OF
THESE CONCEPTS, COULD BECOME A SOURCE OF DISPUTES AND MIS-
UNDERSTANDINGS.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 5,
ITSELF SHOWS THAT THE PRINCIPAL EMPHASIS IN THE FORMULATION
PROPOSED IS, STRICTLY SPEAKING, NOT ON DEFINING LAUNCHERS OF
ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, BUT ON DEFINING "A
BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE...," AND SO FORTH AS IN THE TEXT.
HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT PARAGRAPH 5 OF THIS ARTICLE
MUST BE DEVOTED TO A DESCRIPTION OF PRECISELY WHAT CONSTITUTES
LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF
LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS--AS BORNE
OUT BY THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS--THE U.S. SIDE ATTACHES PARTICU-
LAR IMPORTANCE TO THE USE OF THE WORD "TYPE."

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, AS IN THE CASE OF WORKING OUT THE AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, THE APPROACH IMPLIED IN THIS WORD AT THE PRESENT TIME, WHEN ITS MEANING IN THE CONTEXT UNDER CONSIDERATION IS NOT CLEAR, COULD LEAD TO CONSEQUENCES THE PREVENTION OF WHICH MUST BE OF EQUAL CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES. AS ALREADY SHOWN HERE, THE APPROACH IMPLIED IN THIS WORD AT PRESENT COULD RESULT IN ARBITRARILY AND GROUNDLESSLY ALSO INCLUDING IN THE 1,320 AGGREGATE MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH IN FACT ARE NOT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

IT WOULD SEEM THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE DELEGATIONS TO ENSURE REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT BOTH SIDES ARE PREPARED TO FIND A SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY.

FOR THIS PURPOSE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE, THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF USING THE TERM "LAUNCHER OF A TYPE" IN THIS PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE II, ON CONDITION THAT IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AS COVERING THOSE LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A CERTAIN TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM. IN REACHING SUCH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD INCLUDE LAUNCHERS OF THOSE TYPES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS AND SLBMS WITH TWO OR MORE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE--IN THE EVENT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, IS REACHED--HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY, IN ADDITION TO AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS OF CIBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN AGREED STATEMENT WHICH WOULD RECORD WHICH MISSILES OF THE

SIDES ON THE DATE OS SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ARE MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND WHICH MISSILES WOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS SUCH IN THE FUTURE.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT OUR READINESS TO TAKE THE AFOREMENTIONED STEPS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON THE READINESS OF THE U.S. SIDE TO

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE CONCERNING THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FORMULATIONS BEGING WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 5.

ALL OF THE ABOVE, YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, ARE PARTS OF A SINGLE QUESTION, WHICH MUST BE TAKEN AS A WHOLE.

BY WAY OF CLARIFYING THE CONSIDERATIONS WE EXPRESSED AT THE MAY 27, 1977 MEETING, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT CONSIDERING THE INTEREST MANIFESTED BY THE U.S. SIDE, AND ALSO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THE AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF USING THE TERM "LAUNCHER OF A TYPE," ON CONDITION THAT IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AS COVERING THOSE LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR LAUNCHING A CERTAIN TYPE OF ICBM. IN REACHING SUCH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS OF THOSE TYPES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, TESTED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS.

WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING THE U.S. DELEGATION'S CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS DEALT WITH IN OUR STATEMENT TODAY. EARLE

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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Message Attributes

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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 31-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GENEVA04292
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770194-0111
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977054/aaaaacop.tel
Line Count: 356
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Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
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Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2452012
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV\'S STATEMENTS OF MAY 31, 1977 (SALT TWO - 1201) THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY M
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE USSALTTWO
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/55dfcc8f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009